When States Crack Down on Human Rights Defenders

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Abstract: Research suggests that civil society mobilization together with the ratification of human rights treaties put pressure on governments to improve their human rights practices. An unexplored theoretical implication is that pressure provokes counter-pressure. Instead of improving treaty compliance, some governments will have an interest in de-mobilizing civil society to silence their critics. Yet we do not know how and to what extent this incentive shapes governments' policies and practices regarding civil society organizations. We argue and show—using a new global database of government-sponsored restrictions on civil society organizations—that when governments have committed to human rights treaties *and*, at the same time, continue to commit severe human rights abuses, they impose restrictions on civil society groups to avoid monitoring and mitigate the international costs of abuses.

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Introduction

Why do states use restrictive policies and practices against civil society organizations? There is over two decades of research suggesting that human rights monitoring activities by civil society improve states' compliance with human rights commitments. Pressure on governments to live up to international human rights norms comes both from information flowing from 'below,' from civil society organizations at the national level, and from 'above,' from other states and international organizations acting upon the information from local organizations (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse and Sikkink 1999; Landman 2005; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Simmons 2009; Krain 2012; Murdie and Davis 2012; Smith-Cannoy 2012; Brysk 2013; Risse and Ropp 2013). But what about pressure exerted in the other direction, by state governments *against* those monitoring their activities? We examine states' counter-measures against monitoring by civil society and investigate the conditions under which international human rights treaties lead governments to employ restrictive practices and policies on civil society.

We define civil society organizations as organizations that are not part of the government or the for-profit sector, and which monitor government behavior and advocate for human rights. These organizations may be operating both domestically and internationally. Among the civil society organizations that operate domestically, we include local branches of international organizations, such as local chapters of Amnesty International, which may alert the international 'parent' organization to repression. In recent years, governments have become increasingly inventive in their restrictive practices and policies. For example, the Russian government has since 2012 restricted, by law, the access of local civil society organizations to foreign aid. In 2015, President Vladimir Putin signed legislation that allows the authorities to shut down "undesirable" organizations (Luhn 2015; Tavernise 2015). "Undesirable" organizations were reported to include Human Rights Watch and

Amnesty International, as well as the Carnegie Moscow Center, and the well-known Russian human rights organization Memorial. In July 2015, Russian law enforcement officials raided the offices and homes of staff of Golos, a local non-governmental organization that monitors elections (Nechepurenko 2015), and the Committee Against Torture had to close its operations after the Ministry of Justice listed it as a "foreign agent" (Litvinova 2015). Russia is not alone. In Thailand in September 2016, Amnesty International was warned by the police that its people risked arrest for visa violations if they held an event publicizing a report on torture. Amnesty called off the event (Holmes 2016). More generally, United Nations (UN) special rapporteurs describe the gravity of the problem of harassment, intimidation, and reprisals and observed the "visible shrinking of civil society" (Sekaggya 2013).

We argue that governments restrict the activities of civil society organizations in order to hide non-compliance with human rights norms and commitments. Existing research on human rights treaties describes a "compliance gap" between governments' treaty commitments and their human rights practices (Hathaway 2002; Hafner-Burton 2008; Payne and Abouharb 2016). Yet, if treaty ratification is accompanied by civil society monitoring and mobilization, violating human rights becomes more costly as civil society organizations reveal the gap between treaty provisions and government performance (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Landman 2005; Simmons 2009), thereby sometimes improving government compliance with international human rights standards (Neumayer 2005). Relatedly, the literature on transnational advocacy shows that international shaming campaigns positively influence governments' human rights record, but only if local civil society organizations exist and transmit information on governments' non-compliance to international organizations (Meernik, Aloisi, Sowell, and Nichols 2012; Murdie and Davis 2012). A general theoretical implication of this research—which we explore in this manuscript—is that governments committing human rights abuses and anticipating international costs for doing so may have

an interest in de-mobilizing civil society if they are unable or unwilling to guarantee human rights. To maintain control of insincere or naively assumed international human rights commitments and to keep information about their most severe human rights violations private, states seek discrete ways—for example, registration difficulties, travel obstructions, visa delays, or smearing civil society activists —to manage the monitoring and mobilization activities of civil society organizations.

Using our new dataset of government-imposed policies and practices against civil society, our analysis of a global set of countries from 1994 to 2014 provides support for this argument. States that have ratified human rights treaties—the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention Against Torture (CAT)—impose more restrictions on civil society if they have severe human rights violations to hide. Non-ratifying governments do not increase restrictions on civil society if they commit severe abuses. These findings are robust if we account for endogenous treaty commitments, selection effects, omitted variables, reporting bias, or use alternative measures of key concepts.

This article contributes to the literatures on transnational advocacy, international human rights treaties, and state repression. First, while civil society monitoring and resulting pressures for compliance are conventionally expected to improve performance (e.g. Keck and Sikkink 1998), we show that an alternative is for the state to silence monitoring by civil society groups. As such, our study suggests that one needs to consider how governments treat civil society groups to understand the impact of civil society mobilization and human rights treaties on human rights practices. Other researchers also point out that governments have choices and can adapt their strategies of repression to minimize the pressures resulting from international treaties. So far, researchers have considered strategic adaptation in terms of either augmenting repression (Conrad and Ritter 2013; Ritter and Conrad 2016) or changing to less conspicuous types of repression (McCormick and Mitchell 1997, 514; Payne and

Abouharb 2016). We contribute to this line of research, both theoretically and empirically, by focusing on targeted restrictions on civil society and governments' attempts to hide their misbehavior and alleviate pressure from international human rights regimes. Second, researchers have begun to track shrinking spaces for civil society. Data on laws restricting NGO financing is an important step, but as Dupuy, Ron, and Prakash (2016, 307) point out, we have lacked information on the actual practices of states and non-legal restrictions that interfere with civil society monitoring.[1] We contribute a new dataset on the range of specific policies and practices directed at international and domestic civil society organizations for all countries in the world between 1994 and 2014. The Civil Society Restrictions Dataset accounts for the operational, bureaucratic, and funding costs imposed on organized civil society, including measures of travel restrictions, visa difficulties, surveillance, censorship of publications, and threatening or harassing activists. This disaggregated information on the variety of restrictive policies and practices used by states complements the legal restriction data as well as the V-Dem project approach, which captures some restrictions on an ordinal scale using expert assessments, and the CIRI Freedom of Association and Assembly data, which are focused more broadly on citizens' rights (see Appendix J for empirical comparisons). Finally, there has been only one systematic cross-national study of restrictions on civil society organizations, showing that foreign funding restrictions are more likely if governments receive larger amounts of foreign development aid (Dupuy, Ron, and Prakash 2016). We build on the notion that international pressure is an important factor in explaining government-sponsored restrictions, but we shift the focus to human rights treaties and

[1] See Glasius (2018) for a discussion of "illiberal practices." For the *legal* framework that affects civil society organizations, the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) has data for some 50 countries on foreign funding restrictions. Dupuy, Ron, and Prakash (2016) used ICNL and other sources to construct a dataset on legal restrictions on foreign aid to NGOs for 153 countries for 1993-2012 (see also Christensen and Weinstein 2013). In turn, as restrictions are a response to civil society pressure, so civil society and the international community will respond to restrictions by taking measures to protect human rights defenders (see also Bennett, Ingleton, Nah, and Savage 2015). In further work, we explore how civil society organizations adapt to state restrictions.

transnational advocacy and expand the analysis by examining a comprehensive set of restrictive policies and practices against civil society organizations.

In the remainder, we develop our argument: given, as earlier research has shown, civil society organizations pressure governments to live up to their human rights treaty obligations, governments will have an incentive to increase the costs of this monitoring and restrict the flow of information about their poor performance. We then discuss our research design, accounting for reporting bias and reverse causation, and present findings in line with our main argument. We conclude by discussing implications for theory and policy.

Substantive Background

Our argument for why governments impose restrictions on civil society organizations draws on insights from research on international human rights treaties, transnational advocacy, and state repression. Work on the effects of human rights treaties points to a compliance gap between governments' treaty commitments and their human rights performance (Hathaway 2002; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Payne and Abouharb 2016). Emphasizing the expressive function of treaty commitments, Hathaway (2002) suggests that treaty ratification alleviates internal and external pressures for compliance and human rights improvements. Treaty commitments can be window-dressing and exacerbate negative human rights practices (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005). Yet while treaty ratification can be an "empty promise," not all governments can ignore their commitments (Lupu 2013). Violating human rights becomes costly when treaty ratification is accompanied by civil society monitoring. Civil society organizations can reveal the gap between treaty provisions and government practices (Hafner-Burton and Tsustui 2005; Landman 2005; Simmons 2009). Treaty ratification can improve respect for human rights when there are non-governmental organizations that monitor government behavior and have international linkages. These non-

government organizations can mobilize pressure both from below, for example, from domestic constituencies, *and* pressure from above, for example, from international organizations, third-party states, and individuals (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 2013). Yet, human rights treaties are less effective where governments rule autocratically and inhibit civil society activity (Neumayer 2005). Indeed, Dai (2005; 2013) explicates this role of civil society groups in mobilizing pressures from below. According to her "domestic constituency mechanism," beyond the electoral leverage behind pro-compliance interests, the amount of information that pro-compliance interest groups possess about treaty-relevant government policies is crucial for government compliance with human rights rights.[2] Ritter and Conrad (2016) add that human rights treaty ratification can also mobilize pressure from below. In states where domestic courts are weak, protesters mobilize in the expectation that treaty ratification paired with domestic dissent significantly increases litigation costs for human rights-violating governments. These costs, in turn, can lower government abuses. Overall, the activity of civil society organizations—their ability to monitor and collect information on government behavior as well as their mobilized dissent—are crucial for whether governments incur domestic costs for non-compliance.

Beyond domestic constituency mechanisms, research on international "naming and shaming" campaigns details the role of civil society in mobilizing pressure on governments from above. Pressure from international organizations on governments, that 'boomerangs' from civil society mobilization nationally, improves human rights (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Domestic civil society organizations supply information to international organizations that then name and shame governments. Meernik, Aloisi, Sowell, and Nichols (2012, 233) find that the increasing presence of local human rights organizations "is the critical link between

[2] Lupu (2013) also emphasizes the role of information on human rights violations. He argues that human rights treaty ratification improves freedom of speech, association, assembly, and religion but not physical integrity rights violations because it is easier to obtain information on violations of these freedoms.

the local and the international," generating international attention for government human rights abuses. Moreover, the presence of *domestic* civil society organizations can also render shaming by *international* civil society effective in achieving government compliance with international human rights norms (Murdie and Davis 2012).[3] If domestic civil society can monitor government behavior and form networks with international organizations, governments face reputational and possibly trade, aid, and investment costs if they commit human rights violations (Krain 2012).

As an alternative to improving compliance with insincerely or naively assumed international human rights treaty commitments, governments may also strategically adapt. Having shown that domestic civil society organizations matter for effective international shaming, Murdie and Davis (2012) warn that an increasing number of governments restrict the operations of civil society. Conrad and Ritter (2013; 2016) argue that because treaty commitments encourage domestic pressure, they indirectly create incentives for governments to repress dissent. Their empirical analyses, however, reveals that ratifying the Convention Against Torture (CAT) neither increases nor decreases repression by governments with low security in office and decreases levels of repression for government leaders that are securely in office. In related work, Payne and Abouharb (2016) find that governments, on average, do not improve their human rights behavior after they have ratified a human rights treaty. Noting the weak monitoring and enforcement mechanisms of the human rights regime, their study reveals that treaty member governments tend to shift repressive strategies from employing extrajudicial killings to forced disappearences, which are more difficult to link to the governments (cf. Hafner-Burton 2008). Assuming that some governments will continue to violate human rights despite having promised otherwise by ratifying international treaties, an

[3] Yet, Murdie and Davis (2012, 15) also argue that human rights practices improve in response to shaming paired with international pressures from third parties, even in states with limited civil society presence.

unexplored theoretical implication is that governments will counter domestic pressure for compliance with the international human rights regimes. Governments use discrete bureaucratic and other measures to alleviate the pressure from civil society organizations operating within the boundaries of their state.

Research on restrictions against civil society and its funding has recognized the role of international leverage and linkages in determining government behavior towards civil society organizations. Brechenmacher and Carothers (2014) conceive of restrictions as a symptom of a state's pushback against the international promotion of democracy and human rights. Dupuy, Ron, and Prakash (2016) show that governments legally restrict foreign-funded civil society organizations in an attempt to curtail the influence of international aid on the growth of independent civil society organizaions, especially before national elections. And while Christensen and Weinstein (2013) argue that domestic concerns are paramount in driving vulnerable governments' decision to restrict civil society funding, they also suggest that anticipated international retaliation for such restrictions can restrain governments. This research reveals the links between, on the one hand, international actors and programs and, on the other hand, funding restrictions on civil society. Building on the broader literatures of transnational advocacy, human rights treaties and repression, we turn our attention to how restrictions depend on the interactive impact of government human rights practices and international human rights treaties. Expanding the focus beyond foreign funding restrictions, we collect and analyze new data on different types of restrictive policies and practices imposed on civil society for a global set of countries over time (1994-2014).

Argument: Civil Society, Compliance, and Countermeasures

Our argument is consistent with the transnational advocacy literature in that pressure

from below, from civil society organizations, and from above, from the international human rights regime, increase government incentives to appear to be on their best behavior (e.g. Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse and Sikkink 1999; Hendrix and Wong 2012; Krain 2012; Meernik, Aloisi, Sowell, and Nichols 2012; Murdie and Davis 2012; Brysk 2013; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 2013). However, we argue, rather than improving compliance with the international human rights regime, governments may also continue to violate human rights and hide them from international attention by restricting civil society organizations operating on their territory.

States commit to the international human rights regime in the knowledge that the monitoring of this regime is weak.[4] While a state under "moral management" might keep human rights commitments voluntarily and forego repression (Baron 2009), the uneven record of human rights protection suggests that many states do not. States commit to protect human rights, but it may be an "empty promise" (Thomas 2001; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Hathaway 2002; Simmons 2009).

The international human rights regime is reliant on domestic constituencies for monitoring and detecting non-compliance with international treaties (e.g. Dai 2005; 2013). As Meernik, Aloisi, Sowell, and Nichols (2012, 240) put it: "Local offices of human rights organizations are repositories of information on human rights abuses (…) They collect, investigate, analyze, and disseminate information to advance the cause of human rights in their locale by calling attention to human rights violations (to the extent possible given local conditions)." NGOs inform human rights institutions and treaty bodies, as well as other governments on how a state carries out its international commitments. Earlier research, while noting that there are organizational biases of civil society actors (e.g. Bob 2005), shows that

[4] Governments have various motives for ratifying human rights treaties (Moravscik 2000; Vreeland 2008; Simmons 2009). The costs attached to such commitments—that is, showing a good human rights record—are lower with lower monitoring capacity on the part of the international community.

more abusive states attract the attention of human rights organizations. Civil society organizations lower the auditing cost for the international community, including the major media outlets.

Existing research shows that ratification of human rights treaties with monitoring by civil society creates pressure for compliance. First, treaties such as the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) or the Convention Against Torture (CAT) facilitate monitoring by civil society organizations. Human rights treaties are important to civil society because, as Simmons (2009, 14) puts it, they "sharpen the focus on particular accepted and proscribed behaviors … treaties constrain government because they help define the size of the *expectations gap* when government fail to live up to their provisions." That is, treaties provide a benchmark against which government behavior can be evaluated, and the core provisions of the most prominent human rights treaties, the ICCPR and CAT, are non-derogable. Second, these treaties also help to set the political agenda and induce civil society activities to demand compliance (Conrad and Ritter 2013). For example, domestic human rights activists may use UN human rights treaties to motivate their advocacy. As Thomas (2001) argues in analyzing the effect of the Helsinki Final Act, even if the commitment is "empty," it can generate local and transnational pressure for compliance (see also Snyder 2011). Third, human rights treaties can support domestic courts and therefore increase the litigation costs that government incur for abuse (Simmons 2009, 14-15; Conrad and Ritter 2013). Fourth, states that violate the norms to which they signed up undermine international human rights instruments. Thus, they can expect greater international indignation compared to states that never ratified a human rights treaty. Fifth, ratifying states are required to submit regular reports to treaty bodies, which invites attention from international media, other states, and the UN. Hence, information from civil society organizations contradicting government reports receives greater exposure. Overall, these arguments suggest that ratification of a

human rights treaty invites additional pressures and reputational costs for governments that should incentivize them to appear to be on their best human rights-abiding behavior.[5]

Governments, fearing that civil society actors will expose their failure to live up to their human rights obligations, are expected to close the expectations gap and improve compliance with treaty commitments. As Keck and Sikkink (1998, 24) argue: "Once a government has publicly committed itself to a principle—for example, in favour of human rights or democracy—networks can use those positions, and their command of information, to expose distance between discourse and practice. This is embarrassing to many governments, which may try to save face by closing that distance." More recently, researchers recognize that there is not one linear path to compliance and less repression (e.g. Dai 2013). Murdie and Davis (2012, 14) find that shaming by domestic and international groups together improves compliance with human rights commitments, but also observe that governments increasingly restrict civil society.[6] Ritter and Conrad (2016) argue that increased mobilization may incentivize repression.

As this line of research suggests, governments have choices and not simply between more or less compliance. Governments can improve compliance *or* they can make their non-compliance more difficult to detect. Rather than forego repression, governments seek to hide their severe human rights violations from the international community through targeted counter-measures creating obstacles to detection. Although it is an international regime, there is a dimension that remains subject to the influence of government policy and practice. If, as the spiral theory and the boomerang argument suggests, information on victims and detailed monitoring depend on an information flow from local organizations and the incentivized

[5] In Appendix H we examine whether a similar logic holds for the Rome Statute that sets up the International Criminal Court. Empirical findings provide support for this extension of the argument.
[6] Again, we note that some studies also show that human rights treaty ratification leads states to strategically shift to specific types of violations (Hafner-Burton 2008; Abouharb and Payne 2016). We see this behavior as evidence for our argument that human rights treaties put additional pressure on states to hide their wrongdoing.

domestic constituency, governments can impose registration difficulties, perform tax audits, censor publications of human rights organizations, and smear activists in an effort to manage the flow of information about severe human rights violations and the use of extrajudicial killing, torture, and disappearances. Governments can use these restrictive practices and policies to pre-emptively demobilize civil society in the period in which they commit severe violations and they can employ restrictions retrospectively to prevent civil society mobilization after severe violations have occured. In both scenarios, governments attempt to silence and restrict critical civil society organizations if they are unwilling or unable to improve their human rights behavior and face pressure to comply with treaty obligations:

> **Hypothesis:** If governments are party to a human rights treaty and commit severe human rights violations, then they will impose more restrictions on civil society organizations compared to a) governments that are party to a treaty and commit few violations and b) governments that are not party to a treaty and commit severe violations.

In short, our argument assumes that states react to pressure from international human rights instruments and civil society. It takes as its point of departure two findings in earlier works: there is a gap between the behavior of states and the human rights norms that they have signed up to, *and* human rights violations are more costly when civil society is mobilized to monitor state behavior and states have previously ratified a human rights treaty. The paradox of the enormous growth and success of civil society organizations in providing high-quality information about physical integrity violations to the international community, coupled with most states agreeing these violations are contrary to international law, is the creation of an incentive for governments to silence these actors. This incentive will be strongest—and civil society at highest risk—in states ruled by "empty promisers" that ratify international agreements but frequently violate the norms to which they signed up.[7]

[7] While we argue that monitoring creates an incentive for government restrictions, we do not assume that restrictions are always effective in alleviating pressure to improve human rights performance. In fact, human

Research Design

We examine our argument with a cross-national analysis of state-sponsored restrictions on civil society in 149 states between 1994 and 2014.[8]

Data

Our data come from the the section on "Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights" in the country reports of the United States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. The reports identify government restrictions directed against groups active on human rights issues. For example, in Belarus in 2015:

> Authorities harassed both registered and unregistered human rights organizations, subjected them to frequent inspections and threats of deregistration, reportedly monitored their correspondence and telephone conversations, and harassed family members of group leaders and activists (U.S. Department of State 2015).

Or from Guinea:

> The government facilitated visits by a number of international human rights NGOs and generally cooperated with such organizations; however, none were permitted access to military prisons (U.S. Department of State 2009).

To date, no use has been made of this information on restrictions for systematic analysis.[9] Existing datasets have information on foreign funding restrictions for 153 low and middle-income countries (Dupuy, Ron, and Prakash 2016) and the *legal* framework that affects civil society organizations, collected for some 50 countries (International Center for Not-for-Profit Law 2016). In addition, the V-Dem and the

rights treaty-ratifying governments may first try to hide physical integrity violations by restricting civil society and, in case restrictions are ineffective, take steps to improve their human rights record.

[8] The original data on restrictions on human rights defenders includes 176 countries, but 27 countries are not in our analysis because of missing data on relevant covariates.

[9] Inter-coder reliability is high. For a stratified random sample of 186 country-year observations (strata=years), the rate of agreement between two coders is at 85 percent for harassment, at 88 percent for surveillance and above 92 percent for all other restriction types (cf. Appendix B).

CIRI datasets provide aggregate measures of the situation of civil society organizations, which we use as robustness tests. The V-Dem project provides an ordinal experts-based measure for whether government attempts to repress civil society organizations (Pemstein 2015; Coppedge et al. 2017, 243). While our data relies on public reports and differentiates between various types of restrictive practices and policies (see list below), the V-Dem measure builds on information provided by country experts. It therefore provides an aggregate score of repression against civil society on a four-point ordinal scale ranging from 0 (repression on the scale of Stalinist Russia or Nazi Germany) to 4 (free to organize). The V-Dem measure is less suitable for our purpose of evaluating the extent and diversity of the range of more *subtle* restrictions to hide physical integrity rights violations. The V-Dem measure's reference to large scale repression and inclusion of arrests, public display of force, and disruption of public gatherings—implies conceptual overlap with physical integrity rights abuses. Our disaggregated data is also distinct from the ordinal measure of "freedom of assembly and association" provided in the CIRI dataset, which ranges from 0 for severely restricted freedoms to 2 for freedoms of assembly and association being virtually unrestricted. That is, the CIRI measure does not only include repression targeting civil society organizations but also actions taken more broadly against political parties (Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay 2014). Our dataset permits analyses of the range of types of restrictions that states impose on civil society organizations.

Dependent Variable

Our dependent variable is the prevalence of restrictions on civil society organizations. We construct a count variable of the different types of restrictions, which captures the operational, bureaucratic, and funding costs imposed on organized civil

society. It includes the following types of restrictions:

- banning specific civil society organizations,
- curtailing travel,
- restricting their visits to government sites,
- limiting their domestic funding sources,
- limiting their international funding sources,
- creating difficulties in obtaining visas or denying visas,
- creating difficulties in registering as civil society organizations,
- censoring their publications,
- harassing civil society activists, and
- surveilling civil society activists.

Figure 1 shows the distribution of restrictions across countries for 2014, with the level of restrictions particularly high in the Middle East, Eastern Europe (including Russia), and Central Asia.[10] Half of the yearly observations in our sample show at least one restriction on civil society organizations' mobilization and operation. On average, there are 1.3 types of restrictions per country-year.

[10] We exclude those country-years where independent civil society is fully banned and countries, thus, exclude themselves from the 'boomerang' process—that is where pressure cannot come from below. An outright ban is not a subtle restriction and may not deflect but attract attention from the international community if governments have ratified human rights treaties. However, in Appendix K, we show that results are substantively the same if we include those cases.

Figure 1: Number of restrictions on civil society organizations (2014)



Comparing our measure with the V-Dem measure of repression of civil society and the CIRI freedom of association measures, we find that our data are quite highly but not perfectly correlated with both the V-Dem data (0.55, p-value = 0.00) and CIRI data (rho=0.52, p-value = 0.00). Moreover, our measure also picks up on greater within-country, over-time variation compared to V-Dem and CIRI (see figures in Appendix J), suggesting that our nine-point scale of restrictions provides substantively meaningful nuance in describing how government treats civil society organizations.

Main Explanatory Variables

To measure physical integrity rights violations, we use the five-point ordinal measure from the Political Terror Scale (Gibney et al. 2016) and the latent Human Rights Score by Schnakenberg and Fariss (2014a; 2014b) as an alternative measure that corrects for over-time reporting changes (Fariss 2014).[11] Both measures reflect the conceptual distinction between civil society restrictions and physical integrity rights violations. For example, the 2005 U.S. State Department report on Uganda states that,

[11] We use Fariss's measure as an alternative. See debate (Cingranelli and Filippov 2018; Fariss 2019).

"human rights groups generally operated without government restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases." Nevertheless, this report also records "unlawful killings, disappearances, (…) use of torture and abuse of suspects" of the Ugandan security forces. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate that there is a positive but not perfect correlation between human rights abuses and restrictions in the full sample. To the extent that human rights norms are considered to apply whether or not states have ratified a specific treaty, there will be pressure to comply and an incentive to restrict. But even among cases with severe human rights abuses (x-axis), there are several with no or only a few restrictions on civil society (y-axis). We measure abuses and restrictions contemporaneously because we do not expect one specific temporal ordering. Instead, we think that human rights treaty-ratifying governments will both pre-empt civil society monitoring when they commit abuses, and restrict civil society activity to cover up violations. In Online Appendix M we show that results are substantively the same if we lag human rights abuses and treaty ratification by one year and thus examine the covering-up purpose of restrictions.

Figure 2: Joint distribution of the Political Terror Scale and the restriction count



Figure 3: Joint distribution of Fariss's abuses scores and the restriction count



For human rights treaties, we use two binary variables for whether a state ratified the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention Against Torture (CAT).[12] These variables are interacted with the PTS and Fariss's latent human rights scores, respectively. We also show that results are robust for indicators for either treaty ratification and for a count of treaties (Appendix F). In the first year in our sample, 77 percent of the countries have ratified ICCPR, increasing over the period to 90 percent. Only 53 percent of the countries have ratified the CAT in the first year in our sample, increasing to 77 percent overall. Most variation in treaty commitments is found across countries. Yet, country-specific random effects models show that newly assumed treaty commitments in the period of analysis also drive restrictions on civil society (Appendix E). We note that if restrictions are effective in reducing reports about physical integrity rights violations, then reporting bias should

[12] Data on ratification come from the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (2015).

make it harder to find evidence for our argument and the expectation of a positive relationship between restrictions and the PTS or Fariss's latent human rights abuses scores.

Model Specification and Identification Strategy

Our measure of restrictions is a discrete count variable. Therefore, we use a negative binomial count model.[13] The Wooldridge (2006) test for panel autocorrelation indicated that the outcome variable, the count of restrictions, is serially correlated over time in all models. Therefore, as suggested by Murdie and Davis (2012), we use generalized estimating equation estimation with an autoregressive lag one correlation structure to account for auto-correlation in both coefficient estimates and standard errors.

Our analysis controls for potential confounders that influence physical integrity rights violations and are likely to also affect restrictions and governments' vulnerability to international costs. We account for the best predictors of physical integrity as identified by Hill and Jones (2014) rights violations—the number of constraints on the executive (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2015), judicial independence (Coppedge, Lindberg, Skaaning, and Teorell 2016; Coppedge et al. 2017, 59), and youth bulges (World Bank 2015)—and standard control variables used by Murdie and Davis (2012), capturing the influence of domestic and international civil society mobilization on human rights. That is, we also account for civil society activism with the logged count of protest events (lagged one year) because it may lead governments to use restrictions *and* pressure governments into ratifying human rights treaties.[14] For domestic threats

[13] We do not use a Poisson model because the mean number of types of restriction (1.28) is smaller than the standard deviation (3.38). However, we note that our results hold when using a Poisson model.
[14] Data are obtained from Clark and Regan (2016).

that may provide incentives for states to restrict civil society organizations and abuse human rights, we create a binary variable for whether a state experiences minor or major armed conflict (Gleditsch et al. 2002). We approximate capacity-related incentives to deliver on human rights commitments with z-standardized GDP per capita (in constant U.S. dollars) and population size (World Bank 2015). Summary statistics for all variables are in Appendix A.[15]

We address three further challenges to inference. First, we account for the non-random choice of governments to ratify a human rights treaty with an endogenous treatment model (von Stein 2005). That is, unobserved factors may be influencing both human rights treaty commitments and restrictions, such as prior domestic mobilization. The endogenous treatment model estimates three equations: an equation predicting selection into a human rights treaty, an equation predicting the occurrence of any restrictions in treaty member states, and an equation predicting the occurrence of any restrictions in non-member states. Holding constant observed and unobserved factors that influence both ratification and restrictions lets us estimate the effect of treaty ratification conditional on severe violations. We follow Conrad and Ritter (2013, 404) and use the number of intergovernmental organization memberships (IO) a state maintains during a given year as an instrument for treaty ratification. Results are very similar to the single-stage binomial count model (see Appendix L).

Second, there is the possibility of reverse causation. Our argument suggests that repressive governments use restrictions to mitigate (anticipated) international costs for physical integrity rights violations. Yet if governments observe that restrictions are effective in reducing monitoring, they may also have incentives to sign up to international human rights treaties. If civil society, indeed, chooses to refrain from

[15] We note that there might be other domestic causes of government-sponsored restrictions against civil society.

mobilizing in response to restrictions, then a positive correlation between international human rights treaties and restrictions could be explained by the silencing effect of restrictions and the resulting lower costs for human rights-abusing governments to join international treaties. We test this possibility by examining if restrictions in the current and past year influence whether states ratified one of the human rights treaties, but we find no evidence for reverse causation (Appendix C).

Third, we are concerned about time trends in the human rights violations measures based on U.S. State Department reports (Clark and Sikkink 2013; Schnakenberg and Fariss 2014). Therefore, we estimate our results in a sample with observations after the turn of the century, when reporting bias should no longer affect over-time trends within countries (Poe, Carey, and Vazquez 2001, 677; Clark and Sikkink 2013, 555; see Appendix D). The results remain robust in this restricted sample.

Findings

The analysis provides evidence for our argument that governments prefer to keep information about their physical integrity rights violations private, especially if they are vulnerable to international pressures. Table 1 presents the results for international pressures resulting from ratification of the ICCPR. In line with our key theoretical expectation, Model 1A, without control variables, shows that the interaction effect between the Political Terror Scale—our measure for the severity of physical integrity violations—and the ratification of ICCPR is positive, but it just fails to reach conventional levels of significance. When controlling for observed confounders, the interaction term between ICCPR and the PTS is significant at the 95 percent confidence level. This finding holds when using Fariss's latent human rights scores for both the

model without and with control variables (Models 2A and 2B).

Table 1. Negative binomial model of restrictions against civil society, testing the impact of ICCPR ratification, 1994-2014

	PTS		**Fariss**	
VARIABLES	Model 1A	Model 1B	Model 2A	Model 2B
PTS	0.103+	-0.012		
	(0.059)	(0.029)		
ICCPR	-0.115	-0.472**	-0.037	-0.058
	(0.215)	(0.117)	(0.057)	(0.064)
PTS * ICCPR	0.050	0.162**		
	(0.063)	(0.031)		
Latent human rights abuses score			0.239**	0.037
			(0.041)	(0.058)
Latent abuses * ICCPR			0.034	0.144*
			(0.041)	(0.058)
Protest events (lag 1 year)		0.019**		0.012
		(0.006)		(0.009)
Executive constraints		-0.065**		-0.019+
		(0.008)		(0.011)
Youth bulge		0.718**		0.588**
		(0.107)		(0.202)
Independent judiciary		-0.103**		-0.115**
		(0.008)		(0.016)
Conflict year		0.046**		-0.006
		(0.017)		(0.023)
GDP (stand.)		0.080**		0.074*
		(0.020)		(0.035)
Population (stand.)		0.054**		0.043**
		(0.008)		(0.010)
Constant	-0.240	-2.627**	-0.657**	-2.386**
	(0.211)	(0.342)	(0.058)	(0.600)
Observations	3,001	2,730	3,146	2,593
Deviance	3277	2137	2883	2001

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.

Figure 4: Predicted number of restrictions (ICCPR)



Figure 5: Marginal effect of the PTS



Figure 6: Marginal effect of the ICCPR



Based on the estimates of Model 1B, Figure 4 illustrates that, all else being equal, governments that have ratified the ICCPR and score highest on the PTS employ the largest number of restrictions. This finding is substantively the same for predictions based on the estimated coefficients from Model 2B. In line with our argument, Figure 4 also shows that the predicted count of restriction types increases with the severity of physical integrity rights violations, but only if governments have ratified the ICCPR (black line). In contrast, restrictions neither increase nor decrease with the PTS if governments are not a party to the ICCPR. As illustrated in Figure 5, the marginal effect of the PTS is indeed positive and significant only among governments that ratified the ICCPR. Figure 6 shows that ratification of this human rights treaty increases restrictions for governments that score 5 on the Political Terror Scale. The average difference in restrictions due to ICCPR ratification is negative for countries under secure rule of law or with fewer physical integrity rights violations. Overall, these findings support our argument that internationally vulnerable states have the strongest incentives to hide severe human rights abuses.

The findings are very similar for the effect of physical integrity rights violations conditional on ratification of the Convention Against Torture (CAT), as shown in Models 3A, 3B, 4A, and 4B in Table 2. Based on the estimated coefficient in Model 3B, the graph in Figure 7 shows that the predicted number of restriction types is highest for governments that have ratified the CAT and commit the most severe physical integrity rights violations. Figure 8 illustrates that the marginal effect of the PTS on restrictions is positive only for the states that ratified the CAT, while it is non-significant for the states that have not signed this treaty. Figure 9 shows that ratifying the CAT has a positive effect on restrictions in human rights abusing regimes. However, CAT ratification reduces the number of restrictive practices and policies when governments generally comply with human rights treaties and commit no physical integrity rights violations. Overall, the figures present evidence in line with the argument that governments vulnerable to international pressure tend to impose restrictions on civil society organizations to stop the flow of information on physical integrity rights violations.

Figure 7: Predicted number of restrictions (CAT)



Figure 8: Marginal effect of the PTS



Figure 9: Marginal effect of the CAT



Table 2. Negative binomial model of restrictions against civil society, testing the impact of CAT ratification, 1994-2014

	PTS		Fariss	
VARIABLES	Model 3A	Model 3B	Model 4A	Model 4B
PTS	0.073	-0.007		
	(0.045)	(0.025)		
CAT	-0.156	-0.611**	0.048	0.136*
	(0.170)	(0.102)	(0.050)	(0.060)
PTS * CAT	0.081	0.208**		
	(0.051)	(0.027)		
Latent human rights abuses score			0.201**	0.127**
			(0.030)	(0.040)
Latent abuses * CAT			0.018	0.162**
			(0.030)	(0.046)
Protest events (lag 1 year)		0.053**		0.004
		(0.008)		(0.008)
Executive constraints		-0.059**		-0.055**
		(0.009)		(0.010)
Youth bulge		0.116		1.331**
		(0.077)		(0.169)
Independent judiciary		-0.150**		-0.183**
		(0.009)		(0.013)
Conflict year		0.012		0.062**
		(0.013)		(0.017)
GDP (stand.)		0.023*		0.127**
		(0.012)		(0.026)
Population (stand.)		0.070**		0.094**
		(0.004)		(0.016)
Constant	-0.148	-1.015**	-0.682**	-4.751**
	(0.163)	(0.274)	(0.055)	(0.531)
Observations	2,872	2,730	2,995	2,480
Deviance	3176	2215	2777	1775

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.

What is the substantive significance of these relationships? Table 3 compares the average marginal effects of treaty ratification in human rights-abusing regimes to those of the other independent variables. All else equal, ICCPR ratification among states that severely violate human rights (PTS=5) increases restrictions on civil society by roughly 0.784 types. The effect roughly corresponds to the effect of a 35 standard deviations-increase in protest events (about 170 events) or five standard deviations-increase in GDP per capita (about 64,178 constant U.S.

dollars). CAT ratification among states that severely violate human rights (PTS=5) increases the average number of restriction types by 1.165 types. This effect corresponds to the effect of a 53 standard deviations-increase in protest (about 258 events) and a 10 standard deviations-increase in GDP per capita (about 160,455 constant U.S. dollars). Moreover, human rights violations conditional on CAT and ICCPR ratification have the largest effect sizes among the continuous variables. Other determinants are also important, especially executive constraints, independent judiciaries, and youth bulges.

Table 3. Marginal effects (based on Model 1B)

	Average marginal effect for one st.dev. increase
ICCPR (Political Terror Scale = 1)	-0.330*
ICCPR (Political Terror Scale = 5)	0.784*
CAT (Political Terror Scale = 1)+	-0.368*
CAT (Political Terror Scale = 5)+	1.165*
Political Terror Scale (ICCPR not ratified)	-0.019
Political Terror Scale (ICCPR ratified)	0.271*
Political Terror Scale (CAT not ratified)+	-0.011
Political Terror Scale (CAT ratified)+	0.349*
Protest events (lag 1 year)	0.022*
Executive constraints	-0.158*
Youth bulge	0.197*
Independent judiciary	-0.114*
Conflict year	0.021*
GDP (stand.)	0.115*
Population (stand.)	0.074*

Notes: + based on Model 3B, * significant within 95% confidence interval.

For the control variables, the findings are in line with previous expectations. The measure for protest events is always positive and mostly reaches conventional levels of significance. That is, contentious action of civil society leads governments to impose more restrictions, yet the effect is substantively small. Controlling for civil society mobilization should alleviate concerns that there is a spurious correlation between physical integrity rights violations and the prevalence of restrictions. Regimes with more executive constraints and

independent judiciary impose significantly fewer restrictions. Youth bulges significantly increase restrictions. We do not find that armed conflicts are consistently associated with greater restrictions against civil society. Yet, the effect of armed conflict becomes significantly positive if we exclude the Political Terror Scale. Finally, the coefficients for GDP per capita and population size are non-significant or positive, suggesting that economic development makes governments more sensitive to civil society monitoring or more capable of imposing restrictions on civil society monitoring.[16]

Robustness Tests

Our results remain robust after excluding all cases before 2000 to avoid reporting bias (Appendix D) and are substantively the same for a different model specification, including a pooled negative binomial model and a country-specific random effects negative binomial model estimated with Maximum Likelihood estimation (Appendix E). We also create a measure that is 1 for governments that have ratified the ICCPR or the CAT, and 0 otherwise, as well as a measure for number of treaties that a government has ratified, ranging from 0 to 2. Our substantive findings do not change (Appendix F). Finally, we examine our results by using a related but conceptually different operationalization of restrictions on civil society organizations to alleviate concerns that our results are driven by our measure for the dependent variable (Appendix G). To that end, we use the V-Dem project's data on government attempts to repress civil society. We invert the original measure so that it ranges between 0 for no restrictions and 4 for violent persecution of all members of independent civil society organizations. The analyses reproduce our main findings for the interaction between the human rights treaties and the Fariss's latent human rights abuses scores. The non-significant coefficients of the interactions between the human rights violations measures

[16] We thank the anonymous reviewer for the alternative interpretations.

and CAT point in the expected direction. These findings are noteworthy as the V-Dem measure includes high-visibility practices, such as the disruption of public gatherings or the liquidation of civil society organizations (Pemstein 2015; Coppedge et al. 2017, 243). The results suggest that repressive and governments vulnerable to international pressure use more or less subtle practices to silence voices that could lead to international costs for their abuses.

Conclusion

Our analyses show that states that have ratified human rights treaties impose restrictions on human rights defenders if they have severe human rights violations to hide. Existing research tells us that civil society organizations monitor states' implementation of treaty obligations and inform the international community about non-compliance. This monitoring activity is costly for states. We examine a theoretical implication of this line of research. States have an interest in reducing the cost of repression. Instead of improving their human rights behavior to live up to their treaty commitments, governments seek to make repression less visible by imposing restrictions on civil society organizations.

UN officials and others point to the "shrinking" of civil society space. Yet to date, neither policy makers nor scholars have a good understanding of how systematically states interfere with civil society, the specific measures that they use and which states are most likely to behave in this strategic way. Our new cross-country Civil Society Restrictions Dataset allow scholars to address these questions. These data allow researchers to explore the variety of types of restrictions governments may impose. Future research might investigate the clustering of types of restrictions, transborder diffusion and the impact of these measures on the flow of information.

For the international community, the findings underline the concerns expressed by UN officials and others about closing civil society space. Our study does not suggest that human rights treaties directly worsen the human rights situation. Instead, we contend that

these international instruments and resulting pressures on repressive states create a perverse incentive that may have unintended, negative consequences for civil society activity. Our results should prompt international and domestic policy-makers and human rights practitioners to pay more specific attention to the range of types of restrictions, some of which in isolation may seem relatively benign, on those that monitor and report on human rights. Recently, the UN Human Rights Council considered this issue by passing Resolution 32/31 on Civil Society Space (2016). This resolution recognized "the crucial importance of the active involvement of civil society … in promoting good governance, including through transparency and accountability," and it emphasized first and foremost "that creating and maintaining a safe and enabling environment in which civil society can operate free from hindrance and insecurity assists States in fulfilling their existing international human rights obligations and commitments." Our research would suggest that this type of focused international attention to the harm done by restrictions can help protect civil society and the sustained delivery of public goods.

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Appendices:

When States Crack Down on Human Rights Defenders

Contents of Appendices

Appendix A: Summary statistics

Table A1: Summary statistics, sample size based on model 1B

	N	Mean	Stand. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Number of restrictions	2734	1,28	3,38	0,00	9,00
PTS	2734	2,57	1,20	1,00	5,00
Latent human rights abuses score	2593	-0,44	1,45	-3,95	2,70
ICCPR	2734	0,91	0,28	0,00	1,00
CAT	2734	0,79	0,16	0,00	1,00
ICC	2210	0,50	0,50	0,00	1,00
Executive constraints	2734	4,94	2,04	1,00	7,00
Youth bulge	2734	1,83	3,09	9,75	25,88
Judicial independence	2734	0,60	0,29	0,00	1,00
Protest events (lag 1 year)	2734	0,73	0,90	0,00	4,09
Conflict year	2734	0,16	0,37	0,00	1,00
GDP (stand.)	2734	-0,09	0,99	-0,23	2,02
Population (stand.)	2734	0,00	0,86	-0,27	9,60

Appendix B: Inter-coder reliability: Agreement between two coders in stratified random sample (N=186)

Table B1: Inter-coder reliability scores

Variable	Sample size	Rate of agreement
Government responsiveness to human rights defenders	186	80.11%
All human rights defenders banned	186	97.31%
Some human rights defenders banned	186	93.01%
Activities restricted	186	94.62%
Restricted access to government facilities	186	92.47%
Restricted freedom of movement	186	95.16%
Restricted access to foreign funding	186	98.39%
Restricted access to domestic funding	186	95.70%
Difficulties in obtaining visa	186	94.09%
Visa denied for human rights defenders	186	96.24%
Problems registering as organization	186	94.62%
Government censoring publications	186	93.01%
Human rights defenders face harassment	186	85.48%
Human rights defenders arrested	186	92.47%
Surveillance of human rights defenders	186	88.17%
Killing of human rights defenders	186	98.39%
Co-optation of human rights defenders	186	95.16%
Allies of human rights defenders (OPEN QUESTION)	186	53.76%
Any shortcomings of national human rights institutions	186	83.33%
Government influence over national human rights institutions	186	79.03%
Status of restricted human rights defenders: NGO	186	77.96%
Status of restricted human rights defenders: INGO	186	77.42%
Status of restricted human rights defenders: NHRI	186	85.48%
Status of restricted human rights defenders: IGO	186	82.80%
Status of restricted human rights defenders: TU	186	82.80%
Status of restricted human rights defenders: CSO	186	82.80%

Appendix C: Cox proportional hazard models

Table C1: Cox proportional hazard models estimating the likelihood of ratifying a human rights or humanitarian law treaty conditional on current and past restrictions

	ICCPR		CAT	
VARIABLES	Model C1	Model C2	Model C3	Model C4
Restrictions	0.946	0.787*	0.957	0.907+
	(0.051)	(0.091)	(0.039)	(0.050)
Restr. (lag 1 year)	1.273	1.685	0.868	0.870
	(0.487)	(0.837)	(0.261)	(0.447)
Protest events	0.874	0.428+	1.401*	1.766**
	(0.193)	(0.216)	(0.217)	(0.372)
Executive constraints	1.303*	1.779*	0.999	0.947
	(0.167)	(0.452)	(0.072)	(0.101)
Youth bulges	4.315	12.404	0.037*	0.003**
	(11.097)	(60.205)	(0.053)	(0.006)
Judicial independence	0.725	0.936	0.760	0.597*
	(0.172)	(0.291)	(0.142)	(0.129)
Conflict year	0.590	0.287+	0.612	0.670
	(0.319)	(0.207)	(0.283)	(0.333)
GDP (stand.)	0.853	0.529	0.879	1.275
	(0.248)	(0.305)	(0.160)	(0.378)
Population (stand.)	0.879	0.893	0.823	0.827
	(0.117)	(0.175)	(0.115)	(0.115)
Observations	375	196	728	434
AIC	167	65.56	418.6	165.9
Log Likelihood	-74.52	-23.78	-200.3	-73.97

Notes: Robust seeform in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. Coefficients smaller than 1 mean a lower risk of ratification. Models C2 and C4 are estimated for countries that score 3 or higher on the Political Terror Scale.

Appendix D: Estimation in restricted sample after 2000

Table D1. Negative binomial model of restrictions testing ICCPR ratification, 2001-2014

VARIABLES	Model D1	Model D2	Model D3	Model D4
PTS	0.043	-0.115		
	(0.088)	(0.139)		
ICCPR	-0.315	-1.022*	-0.062	-0.294
	(0.297)	(0.457)	(0.170)	(0.211)
ICCPR * PTS	0.096	0.284*		
	(0.091)	(0.144)		
Latent human rights abuses score			0.719**	0.154
			(0.137)	(0.181)
ICCPR * Latent abuses			0.026	0.522**
			(0.143)	(0.182)
Protest events (lag 1 year)		0.073*		0.041
		(0.032)		(0.035)
Executive constraints		-0.106**		-0.080*
		(0.031)		(0.034)
Youth bulge		1.863**		1.541*
		(0.550)		(0.608)
Independent judiciary		-0.522**		-0.490**
		(0.080)		(0.082)
Conflict year		0.143		0.023
		(0.094)		(0.103)
GDP (stand.)		0.102		0.260*
		(0.102)		(0.105)
Population (stand.)		0.259**		0.145*
		(0.055)		(0.059)
Constant	0.198	-4.841**	0.394*	-4.097*
	(0.290)	(1.664)	(0.173)	(1.795)
Observations	2,157	1,920	2,042	1,782
Deviance	2516	1389	1714	1118

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.

Table D2. Negative binomial model of restrictions testing CAT ratification, 2001-2014

VARIABLES	Model D5	Model D6	Model D7	Model D8
PTS	0.107**	-0.066		
	(0.037)	(0.096)		
CAT	-1.845**	-0.877*	0.026	-0.145
	(0.182)	(0.354)	(0.062)	(0.156)
PTS * CAT	0.554**	0.263*		
	(0.046)	(0.103)		
Latent human rights abuses score			0.188**	0.175
			(0.033)	(0.128)
Latent abuses * CAT			0.034	0.550**
			(0.037)	(0.135)
Protest events (lag 1 year)		0.071*		0.037
		(0.032)		(0.036)
Executive constraints		-0.121**		-0.103**
		(0.031)		(0.034)
Youth bulge		1.855**		1.558*
		(0.551)		(0.615)
Independent judiciary		-0.513**		-0.479**
		(0.080)		(0.082)
Conflict year		0.169+		0.058
		(0.095)		(0.105)
GDP (stand.)		0.132		0.318**
		(0.101)		(0.105)
Population (stand.)		0.265**		0.167**
		(0.055)		(0.059)
Constant	-1.326**	-4.958**	-0.612**	-4.142*
	(0.146)	(1.651)	(0.061)	(1.814)
Observations	2,872	1,920	2,042	1,782
Deviance	3934	1377	1927	1111

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.

Appendix E: Negative binomial models pooled and with random effects

Table E1: Negative binomial model with cluster-robust standard errors

	Model E1	Model E2	Model E3	Model E4
PTS	0.095		0.089	
	(0.144)		(0.093)	
ICCPR	-1.160*	-0.234		
	(0.482)	(0.156)		
PTS * ICCPR	0.320*			
	(0.149)			
Latent human rights abuses score		0.184		0.178
		(0.156)		(0.111)
Latent abuses * ICCPR		0.364*		
		(0.160)		
CAT			-1.019**	0.067
			(0.387)	(0.135)
PTS * CAT			0.372**	
			(0.105)	
Latent abuses * CAT				0.420**
				(0.116)
Protest events (lag 1 year)	0.092+	0.045	0.072	0.023
	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.055)
Executive constraints	-0.171**	-0.143**	-0.201**	-0.174**
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Independent judiciary	-0.397**	-0.394**	-0.375**	-0.374**
	(0.079)	(0.085)	(0.075)	(0.079)
Youth bulge	1.797**	1.663**	1.870**	1.775**
	(0.528)	(0.575)	(0.518)	(0.558)
Conflict year	0.183	0.051	0.211	0.086
	(0.160)	(0.168)	(0.151)	(0.162)
GDP (stand.)	0.287**	0.328**	0.317**	0.364**
	(0.088)	(0.090)	(0.083)	(0.084)
Population (stand.)	0.213**	0.180**	0.250**	0.221**
	(0.038)	(0.030)	(0.044)	(0.049)
Constant	-4.898**	-4.251*	-5.158**	-4.641**
	(1.629)	(1.659)	(1.584)	(1.656)
Observations	2,732	2,596	2,732	2,596
Log Likelihood	-3488	-3250	-3473	-3229

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.

Table E2: Country-specific random effects negative binomial model

	Model E5	Model E6	Model E7	Model E8
PTS	-0.030		0.011	
	(0.075)		(0.052)	
ICCPR	-0.478+	-0.027		
	(0.258)	(0.099)		
PTS * ICCPR	0.158*			
	(0.078)			
Latent human rights abuses score		0.003		0.005
		(0.104)		(0.072)
Latent abuses * ICCPR		0.162		
		(0.103)		
CAT			-0.120	0.271**
			(0.207)	(0.090)
PTS * CAT			0.134*	
			(0.058)	
Latent abuses * CAT				0.241**
				(0.075)
Protest events (lag 1 year)	0.061*	0.056*	0.055*	0.048+
	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.027)
Executive constraints	-0.041*	-0.039+	-0.063**	-0.061**
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.022)
Independent judiciary	-0.302**	-0.298**	-0.311**	-0.320**
	(0.049)	(0.053)	(0.049)	(0.053)
Youth bulge	1.802**	2.247**	1.850**	2.303**
	(0.289)	(0.321)	(0.289)	(0.319)
Conflict year	-0.041	-0.035	-0.050	-0.069
	(0.061)	(0.066)	(0.061)	(0.066)
GDP (stand.)	0.452**	0.451**	0.392**	0.410**
	(0.095)	(0.098)	(0.093)	(0.095)
Population (stand.)	0.251**	0.255**	0.250**	0.244**
	(0.093)	(0.095)	(0.088)	(0.087)
Constant	-4.911**	-4.296*	-4.279**	-3.655*
	(1.630)	(1.674)	(1.513)	(1.705)
Observations	2,736	2,600	2,736	2,600
Log Likelihood	-3491	-3254	-3445	-3221

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.

Appendix F: Combined indicator for ratification of any treaty and count of treaties

Table F1. Negative binomial model of restrictions, testing the effect of the combined treaty measures

	Binary treaty measure		Count of treaties	
VARIABLES	Model F1	Model F2	Model F3	Model F4
PTS	-0.045		-0.045	
	(0.039)		(0.032)	
Any treaty ratified	-0.619**	-0.074		
	(0.138)	(0.066)		
PTS * Any treaty	0.198**			
	(0.041)			
Latent human rights abuses score		0.050		-0.029
		(0.058)		(0.041)
Latent abuses * Any treaty		0.156**		
		(0.058)		
Count of treaties			-0.217**	-0.010
			(0.067)	(0.032)
PTS * Count of treaties			0.088**	
			(0.018)	
Latent abuses * Count of treaties				0.125**
				(0.026)
Protest events (lag 1 year)	0.008	0.023**	0.031**	0.014
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Executive constraints	-0.056**	-0.026**	-0.056**	-0.040**
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.011)
Independent judiciary	-0.128**	-0.125**	-0.092**	-0.099**
	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.013)
Youth bulge	0.531**	0.729**	1.056**	0.708**
	(0.144)	(0.153)	(0.158)	(0.185)
Conflict year	0.031*	-0.075**	0.027	-0.033
	(0.015)	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.024)
GDP (stand.)	0.094**	0.093**	0.077**	0.120**
	(0.023)	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.032)
Population (stand.)	0.061**	0.060**	0.075**	0.079**
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Constant	-2.003**	-2.782**	-3.599**	-2.644**
	(0.447)	(0.459)	(0.491)	(0.551)
Observations	2,730	2,593	2,730	2,593
Deviance	2152	1980	2149	1936

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.

Appendix G: Model for the V-dem scale of government-sponsored repression of civil society

Table G1. Ordinal logit model on the V-Dem ordinal measure of repression of civil society

	Model G1	Model G2	Model G3	Model G4
PTS	0.019		0.022	
	0.019		0.022	
Latent human rights abuses	(0.027)		(0.021)	
	-0.141	-0.096		
ICCPR	(0.110)	(0.072)		
	0.020			
PTS * ICCPR	(0.030)			
		0.148+		0.252**
Latent abuses * ICCPR		(0.081)		(0.057)
		0.174*		
CAT		(0.077)		
			-0.104	-0.043
PTS * CAT			(0.085)	(0.051)
			0.020	
Latent abuses * CAT			(0.024)	
				0.057
Protest events (lag 1 year)				(0.050)
	-0.002	-0.004	-0.002	-0.004
Executive constraints	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)
	-0.028**	-0.017	-0.028**	-0.015
Independent judiciary	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)
	-0.485**	-0.476**	-0.486**	-0.464**
Youth bulge	(0.040)	(0.042)	(0.040)	(0.041)
	0.717*	0.730*	0.709*	0.726*
Conflict year	(0.322)	(0.356)	(0.322)	(0.353)
	0.017	-0.007	0.018	-0.008
GDP (stand.)	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.028)
	-0.094	0.022	-0.090	0.025
Population (stand.)	(0.079)	(0.085)	(0.079)	(0.084)
	0.048	0.000	0.050	-0.005
Constant	-3.765**	-3.730**	-3.782**	-3.753**
	(0.943)	(1.039)	(0.939)	(1.032)
Observations	2,922	2,781	2,922	2,781
Deviance	3030	2643	3052	2741

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.

Appendix H: Testing the effect of ICC membership

Beyond human rights treaties, the Rome Statute that sets up the ICC—and gives the court jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes occurring since July 1, 2002, and allows the ICC prosecutor to initiate investigations—imposes costs on individual leaders of states that commit severe human rights violations. Indeed, research shows that not only a guilty verdict but also investigations by the ICC impose reputational costs on governments with their domestic and international audiences and have a deterrent effect on human rights violations (Appel 2016).[17] As with human rights treaties, civil society plays a crucial monitoring and reporting role, exposing the responsibility of leaders for human rights violations and providing evidence in ICC investigations: "[l]ocal and international human rights NGOs will also arrive quickly [after atrocities occur] with the aim of establishing what happened and documenting the violations. [...] Human rights NGOs are likely to broadly share the goals of the ICC to combat impunity for gross violations of human rights and international humanitarian law" (Human Rights First/Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 2004, 3). While some governments may sincerely ratify the Rome Statute and intend to use the ICC to credibly signal—both to the opposition and the broader public—their willingness to respect the human rights of political rivals (Simmons and Danner 2010), closer scrutiny provides little empirical support for this argument (Chapman and Chaudoin 2013). If not all states are sincere ratifiers of the ICC, it is also plausible that non-sincerely ratifying governments seek to circumvent investigations by the ICC by interfering with the monitoring of civil society organizations. For example, the Kenyan government leaders Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto launched a smear campaign against civil society organizations

[17] Appel (2016, 9-10) examines the Rome Statute's deterrent effect and argues: "Potential perpetrators can suffer international costs across all stages of ICC's involvement. The logic here is similar to work that focuses on how international actors and organizations can engage in naming/shaming and other forms of international coercion." Beyond the reputational effect, he points to third party sanctioning and the impact in reducing "the benefits accrued from international cooperation (i.e., foreign direct investment, military assistance, etc.)." See also Cronin-Furman 2013.

collaborating with the ICC prosecutor, with Ruto stating: "NGOs should stop interfering with government matters, writing letters to their donors abroad to support the ICC intervention and compiling reports about post-election violence. It is none of their business" (HRW 2013, par. 12 in Wood 2016, 536). That is, governments that continue to commit severe human rights violation and have ratified the Rome Statute may have an incentive to impose restrictions on civil society organizations and silence those that could give testimony at the ICC.

We indeed find support for the claim that state leaders tend to impose more restrictions on civil society groups when they commit physical integrity rights violations and are a party to the Rome Statute. The analyses for the conditional effect of ICC membership excludes states that currently experience armed conflict (242 country-year observations). In war-torn states, ratifying governments may expect to escape international criticism for human rights abuses because they can either blame them on insurgents or frame them as necessary anti-insurgency measures. As such, we expect that war-torn ICC-ratifying states are less likely to cover up their abuses by imposing restrictions on civil society.[18] If we include war-torn states (or sincere ratifiers) in the sample, the results are less strong but still in line with our argument (see analyses below). In Table H1, the interaction terms between ICC membership and our measures for physical integrity rights violations—the PTS and Fariss's latent human rights abuses scores—have positive and significant coefficients across all models. Figure H1, based on Model H2, reveals that, all else equal, states that ratify the Rome Statute use fewer restrictions against civil society organizations unless they commit severe physical integrity rights violations (score 4 or 5 on the PTS). As is the case with the human rights treaties, restrictions increase with physical integrity rights violations if the government has ratified the Rome Statute. For states that are not members of the ICC,

[18] Simmons and Danner (2010) suggest that war-torn non-democracies seek to credibly signal their sincere intent to improve human rights and to persuade the armed opposition to lay down their weapons. This possibility—though empirically less plausible (see Chapman and Chaudoin 2013)—may also dampen the effect of ICC ratification on restrictions against civil society among ICC-ratifying states.

physical integrity rights violations do not significantly increase or decrease the predicted number of restrictions. As Figure H2 illustrates, the marginal effect of the PTS is only significant and positive for ICC member states. Figure H3 shows that ratification of the Rome Statute decreases restrictions on civil society organizations for states that are unlikely to kill and torture their citizens. Yet, and in line with our argument, the ratification of the Rome Statute by states that frequently resort to the use of killing and torture—that is, states that have something to hide—tends to increase the number of restrictions.

Figure H1. Predicted number of restrictions (ICC)



Figure H2. Marginal effect of PTS



Figure H3. Marginal effect of ICC



Table H1. Negative binomial model of restrictions against civil society, testing the impact of Rome Statute ratification that created the ICC, 2002-2014

	PTS		**Fariss**	
VARIABLES	Model H1	Model H2	Model H3	Model H4
PTS	0.031*	0.081		
	(0.016)	(0.069)		
ICC member	-0.936**	-1.588**	-0.525**	-0.820**
	(0.129)	(0.316)	(0.065)	(0.137)
PTS * ICC	0.125**	0.226*		
	(0.036)	(0.096)		
Latent human rights abuses score			0.116**	0.347**
			(0.020)	(0.101)
Latent abuses * ICC			0.254**	0.412**
			(0.044)	(0.127)
Protest events (lag 1 year)		0.058		0.018
		(0.039)		(0.040)
Independent judiciary		-0.460**		-0.431**
		(0.079)		(0.083)
Executive constraints		-0.105**		-0.073*
		(0.034)		(0.036)
Youth bulge		1.265*		1.155+
		(0.545)		(0.624)
Conflict year		0.136		0.011
		(0.110)		(0.116)
GDP (stand.)		0.059		0.200+
		(0.098)		(0.106)
Population (stand.)		0.193**		0.124*
		(0.052)		(0.057)
Constant	-0.484**	-3.400*	-0.414**	-2.834
	(0.057)	(1.606)	(0.028)	(1.829)
Observations	2,078	1,788	1,945	1,650
Deviance	1834	1121	1500	953.4

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.

In Table H2, we present the results for the analyses with the sample that includes war-torn states. The predicted count of restrictions still significantly increases restrictions in states that commit sincere human rights abuses (see Figure H4 and H5). This finding supports our argument. However, as shown in Figure H6, the marginal effect of ICC membership is now significantly negative for both human rights-abiding states (PTS low) and human rights-abusing states (PTS high). Although, the "protection" effect of the ICC for civil society

organizations is still much smaller (only half the size) in human rights-abusing regimes. This trend again supports our argument.

Table H2. Negative binomial model of restrictions against civil society, testing the impact of Rome Statute ratification that created the ICC, 2002-2014, including states in armed conflict

	PTS		**Fariss**	
VARIABLES	Model H1	Model H2	Model H3	Model H4
PTS	0.065**	0.016		
	(0.023)	(0.022)		
ICC member	-2.477**	-1.280**	-0.530**	-0.324**
	(0.197)	(0.164)	(0.069)	(0.077)
PTS * ICC	0.598**	0.304**		
	(0.048)	(0.038)		
Latent human rights abuses score			0.155**	0.167**
			(0.030)	(0.041)
Latent abuses * ICC			0.272**	0.296**
			(0.049)	(0.055)
Protest events (lag 1 year)		0.007		-0.010
		(0.012)		(0.010)
Independent judiciary		-0.043**		-0.205**
		(0.016)		(0.022)
Executive constraints		-0.094**		-0.041**
		(0.013)		(0.013)
Youth bulge		-0.025		0.338+
		(0.220)		(0.188)
Conflict year		--		--
GDP (stand.)		-0.027		0.001
		(0.038)		(0.037)
Population (stand.)		0.031**		0.015
		(0.009)		(0.011)
Constant	-0.606**	-0.180	-0.406**	-1.613**
	(0.075)	(0.644)	(0.031)	(0.571)
Observations	1,772	1,537	1,636	1,417
Deviance	1458	1037	1257	896.8

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.

Figure H4. Predicted number of restrictions (ICC)



Figure H5. Marginal effect of PTS



Figure H6. Marginal effect of ICC



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CHAPMAN, TERRENCE L., and STEPHEN CHAUDOIN. 2013. Ratification Patterns and the International Criminal Court. *International Studies Quarterly* 57 (2): 400–409.

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SIMMONS, BETH. A., and ALLISON DANNER. 2010. Credible Commitments and the International Criminal Court. *International Organization* 64 (2): 225–256.

Appendix J: Comparison between our data, V-Dem and CIRI






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Bosnia-Herzegovina
Botswana
Brazil
Brunei
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso (Upper Volta)
Burundi
Cambodia (Kampuchea)
Cameroon
Canada
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
Chile
China
Colombia
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
V-Dem CIRI Our data


Comoros
Congo
Congo, Democratic Republic of
Costa Rica
Ivory Coast
Croatia
Cuba
Cyprus
Czech Republic
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
V-Dem CIRI Our data


Denmark
Djibouti
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Egypt
El Salvador
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Eritrea
Estonia
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
V-Dem CIRI Our data


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France
Gabon
Gambia
Georgia
Germany
Ghana
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
V-Dem CIRI Our data


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Guatemala
Guinea
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Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Hungary
Iceland
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
V-Dem CIRI Our data


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Indonesia
Iran (Persia)
Iraq
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
V-Dem CIRI Our data


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Kazakhstan
Kenya
North Korea
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Kosovo
Kuwait
Kyrgyz Republic
Laos
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
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2008 2010 2012 2014
V-Dem CIRI Our data


Laos
Latvia
Lebanon
Lesotho
Liberia
Libya
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Macedonia (Former Yugoslavia)
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
V-Dem CIRI Our data


Madagascar (Malagasy)
Malawi
Malaysia
Maldives
Mali
Malta
Marshall Islands
Mauritania
Mauritius
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
2008 2009 2010
V-Dem CIRI Our data


Madagascar (Malagasy)
Malawi
Malaysia
Maldives
Mali
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Marshall Islands
Mauritania
Mauritius
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
2008 2009 2010
V-Dem CIRI Our data


Namibia
Nepal
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Norway
Oman
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
V-Dem CIRI Our data


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Panama
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Paraguay
Peru
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Poland
Portugal
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1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
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
Qatar
Rumania
Russia (Soviet Union)
Rwanda
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Serbia
Sierra Leone
Singapore
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
V-Dem CIRI Our data


Slovakia
Slovenia
Solomon Islands
Somalia
South Africa
South Sudan
Spain
Sri Lanka (Ceylon)
Sudan
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
2011 2012 2013 2014
V-Dem CIRI Our data


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Swaziland
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Switzerland
Syria
Taiwan
Tajikistan
Tanzania
Thailand
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
V-Dem CIRI Our data


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Togo
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Uganda
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
Uruguay
Uzbekistan
Venezuela
Vietnam, Republic of
Yemen
Zambia
Zimbabwe (Rhodesia)
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
V-Dem
CIRI
Our data

Appendix K: Analyses include states where civil society is officially banned

Table K1. Negative binomial model of restrictions against civil society including states where civil society is officially banned

VARIABLES	Model K1	Model K2	Model K3	Model K4
PTS	-0.006		-0.011	
	(0.015)		(0.015)	
ICCPR	-0.205**	-0.175**		
	(0.063)	(0.032)		
PTS * ICCPR	0.044*			
	(0.018)			
Latent human rights abuses score		-0.001		0.014
		(0.028)		(0.026)
Latent abuses * ICCPR		0.092**		
		(0.028)		
CAT			-0.617**	-0.065*
			(0.067)	(0.033)
PTS * CAT			0.184**	
			(0.018)	
Latent abuses * CAT				0.114**
				(0.029)
Protest events (lag 1 year)	0.003	0.000	-0.006	-0.026**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Executive constraints	-0.048**	-0.052**	-0.081**	-0.046**
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Youth bulge	0.351*	0.502**	0.372**	0.489**
	(0.138)	(0.138)	(0.068)	(0.121)
Independent judiciary	-0.081**	-0.062**	-0.089**	-0.070**
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.015)
Conflict year	0.009	-0.010	0.012	0.012
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.019)
GDP (stand.)	0.060*	0.066**	0.105**	0.101**
	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.011)	(0.024)
Population (stand.)	0.034**	0.028**	0.045**	0.051**
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Constant	-1.369**	-1.708**	-1.372**	-1.793**
	(0.411)	(0.414)	(0.214)	(0.362)
Observations	2,924	2,782	2,924	2,782
Deviance	2852	2500	2737	2608

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.

Appendix L: Endogenous treatment models for ICCPR and CAT

Table L1. Endogenous treatment model for ICCPR ratification, 1994-2014

VARIABLES	Model L1: PTS			Model L2: Fariss		
	Selection: ICCPR ratified or not	Outcome restrictions: among ratifiers	Outcome restrictions: Among Non-ratifiers	Selection: ICCPR ratified or not	Outcome restrictions: among ratifiers	Outcome restrictions: Among Non-ratifiers
PTS	0.242***	0.421***	0.053			
	(0.047)	(0.045)	(0.184)			
Latent abuses score				0.162***	0.566***	0.386**
				(0.050)	(0.054)	(0.174)
Protest events (lag 1 year)	-0.002	0.047	-0.262*	-0.015	-0.008	-0.294**
	(0.043)	(0.036)	(0.135)	(0.044)	(0.038)	(0.143)
Executive constraints	0.235***	-0.114***	-0.287**	0.225***	-0.097***	-0.229
	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.124)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.148)
Youth bulge	-0.219	0.965***	0.754	-0.223	0.705**	0.967
	(0.289)	(0.254)	(1.028)	(0.298)	(0.277)	(1.015)
Independent judiciary	-0.055	-0.705***	-0.420**	-0.054	-0.667***	-0.399**
	(0.044)	(0.069)	(0.172)	(0.044)	(0.070)	(0.170)
Conflict year	-0.242**	0.068	0.204	-0.156	-0.061	-0.115
	(0.107)	(0.104)	(0.344)	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.338)
GDP (stand.)	-0.245***	0.109**	0.455***	-0.256***	0.157***	0.534***
	(0.053)	(0.050)	(0.146)	(0.055)	(0.052)	(0.159)
Population (stand.)	-0.300***	0.933***	1.043***	-0.299***	0.741***	0.697*
	(0.030)	(0.132)	(0.394)	(0.031)	(0.143)	(0.406)
IO memberships	0.031***			0.032***		
	(0.003)			(0.003)		
Constant	0.242***	0.421***	0.053	-0.815	-1.825**	-0.736
	(0.047)	(0.045)	(0.184)	(0.902)	(0.810)	(3.004)
Rho	0.486***		-0.060	0.431***		0.178
	(0.161)		(0.527)	(0.167)		(0.576)
Observations	2,904			2,763		

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.

Table L2. Endogenous treatment model for CAT ratification, 1994-2014

VARIABLES	**Model L3: PTS**			**Model L4: Fariss**		
	Selection: CAT ratified or not	Outcome restrictions: among ratifiers	Outcome restrictions: Among Non-ratifiers	Selection: CAT ratified or not	Outcome restrictions: among ratifiers	Outcome restrictions: Among Non-ratifiers
PTS	0.043	0.431***	0.149*			
	(0.039)	(0.051)	(0.079)			
Latent abuses score				-0.072*	0.600***	0.289***
				(0.043)	(0.061)	(0.090)
Protest events (lag 1 year)	0.102***	0.034	-0.077	0.111***	-0.035	-0.095
	(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.091)	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.093)
Executive constraints	0.156***	-0.146***	-0.309***	0.135***	-0.115***	-0.319***
	(0.018)	(0.025)	(0.068)	(0.019)	(0.026)	(0.059)
Youth bulge	-2.412***	0.859***	0.440	-2.299***	0.562*	0.368
	(0.280)	(0.276)	(1.013)	(0.286)	(0.296)	(0.972)
Independent judiciary	-0.220***	-0.814***	-0.380***	-0.223***	-0.787***	-0.316**
	(0.040)	(0.076)	(0.127)	(0.041)	(0.079)	(0.128)
Conflict year	-0.158*	0.179	-0.126	-0.032	0.024	-0.277
	(0.087)	(0.115)	(0.215)	(0.091)	(0.121)	(0.213)
GDP (stand.)	-0.066	0.190***	0.375***	-0.098**	0.247***	0.413***
	(0.045)	(0.053)	(0.092)	(0.046)	(0.056)	(0.095)
Population (stand.)	-0.164***	0.763***	1.187***	-0.148***	0.516***	1.027***
	(0.024)	(0.135)	(0.313)	(0.024)	(0.146)	(0.325)
IO memberships	0.026***			0.027***		
	(0.003)			(0.003)		
Constant	5.387***	-3.487***	0.067	5.122***	-1.345	0.813
	(0.820)	(0.763)	(3.050)	(0.849)	(0.841)	(3.002)
Rho	0.244		0.067	0.270*		0.021
	(0.154)		(0.402)	(0.158)		(0.384)
Observations	2,904			2,763		

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.

Figure L1: Effects: PTS * ICCPR



Figure L2: Effects: Fariss * ICCPR



Figure L3: Effects: PTS * CAT



Figure L4: Effects: Fariss * CAT



Appendix M: Lag of abuses and treaty measures

We propose that governments may use pre-emptive restrictions on civil society organizations in order to hide prospective abuses. Therefore, we measure abuses and restrictions contemporaneously. We also propose that government may use restrictions in order to cover up abuses that have already occurred. This possibility is tested in the analyses below. We find that lagged measures of human rights abuses (PTS and Fariss's latent human rights abuses scores) and lagged measures of treaty ratification, all else equal, predict restrictions. Yet, there is one exception. The interaction between CAT ratification and PTS is still positive but no longer significant at conventional levels. In comparison to contemporaneous measures used in the main analysis, the effects sizes of abuses and treaty ratification on restrictions are not significantly different. Overall, we conclude that governments tend to use both pre-emptive and retrospective measures to silence the monitoring civil society activists.

Table M1. Negative binomial model of restrictions against civil society, using one year lags of PTS and ICCPR ratification

VARIABLES	**PTS**		**Fariss**	
	Model M1A	Model M1B	Model M2A	Model M2B
PTS (lag 1 year)	0.103+	-0.052+		
	(0.053)	(0.030)		
ICCPR (lag 1 year)	-0.020	-0.309**	-0.054	-0.073
	(0.194)	(0.104)	(0.051)	(0.049)
PTS (lag 1 year) * ICCPR (lag 1 year)	-0.005	0.109**		
	(0.057)	(0.032)		
Latent abuses scores (lag 1 year)			0.172**	0.077+
			(0.039)	(0.047)
Latent abuses (lag 1 yr) * ICCPR (lag 1 yr)			0.027	0.141**
			(0.041)	(0.047)
Protest events (lag 1 year)		0.033**		0.045**
		(0.009)		(0.008)
Executive constraints		-0.026*		-0.032**
		(0.010)		(0.009)
Youth bulge		0.792**		0.704**
		(0.192)		(0.167)
Independent judiciary		-0.123**		-0.136**
		(0.014)		(0.012)
Conflict year		0.026		-0.041*
		(0.020)		(0.018)
GDP (stand.)		0.045		0.096**
		(0.034)		(0.030)
Population (stand.)		0.057**		0.067**
		(0.009)		(0.006)
Constant	-0.166	-2.900**	-0.613**	-2.766**
	(0.192)	(0.574)	(0.051)	(0.492)
Observations	2,998	2,730	3,143	2,593
Deviance	3378	2301	2941	1982

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.

Table M2. Negative binomial model of restrictions against civil society, using one year lags of PTS and CAT ratification

VARIABLES	PTS		Fariss	
	Model M3A	Model M3B	Model M4A	Model M4B
PTS (lag 1 year)	0.121**	0.051		
	(0.042)	(0.065)		
CAT (lag 1 year)	0.107	-0.108	0.112	0.164
	(0.162)	(0.252)	(0.102)	(0.123)
PTS (lag 1 year) * CAT (lag 1 year)	-0.025	0.105		
	(0.048)	(0.074)		
Latent abuses scores (lag 1 year)			0.637**	0.315**
			(0.085)	(0.110)
Latent abuses (lag 1 yr) * ICCPR (lag 1 yr)			0.024	0.269*
			(0.093)	(0.117)
Protest events (lag 1 year)		0.067*		0.041
		(0.029)		(0.031)
Executive constraints		-0.113**		-0.103**
		(0.028)		(0.030)
Youth bulge		1.866**		1.747**
		(0.530)		(0.571)
Independent judiciary		-0.491**		-0.471**
		(0.072)		(0.073)
Conflict year		0.142+		0.052
		(0.082)		(0.090)
GDP (stand.)		0.095		0.249**
		(0.092)		(0.094)
Population (stand.)		0.346**		0.252**
		(0.062)		(0.065)
Constant	-0.254	-5.715**	0.029	-5.135**
	(0.159)	(1.569)	(0.104)	(1.678)
Observations	2,870	2,553	2,831	2,480
Deviance	3239	1830	2321	1572

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.